Paradoxes of Conflict
Edward Luttwak
Randall Forsberg's observation that the "recent military policies of the
United States and other large, industrial countries remain astonishingly unchanged,"
given the end of the Cold War, is unexceptionable, though scarcely astonishing:
the proponents of those policies, and millions of beneficiaries from CEOs
to NCOs, are far more successful than welfare mothers in securing the public's
indulgence for their proclivities, having better PR themes and vast PR resources--both
human (today's front-line troops are the public affairs officers) and pecuniary
(the taxpayer pays to be persuaded to pay)--in part spent to allow Hollywood
to perpetrate its recent outpouring of triumphalist sci-fi/military melodramas.
(If Hertz rented F-117s, it would have to charge some $350,000 per day, with
limited mileage.)
One incidental consequence is that thematically more evocative traditional
military forces are systematically advantaged in the budgetary free-for-all
over newer, more technical forces that are merely effective (e.g., manned
and unmanned offensive airpower, in the new age of routine precision). Hence
the former are grossly overfunded, especially when they are manpower-intensive,
and therefore of scant utility given the demographically driven societal refusal
to tolerate combat casualties. With its statutory three Marine divisions
and a casualty limit of less than 1,000 or so for a Gulf War and less than
20 for a Somalia-type discretionary intervention, the US is in the position
of a man who pays credit-card interest rates on three golden Rolls Royces,
but has only half a pint of gasoline.
For the rest, however, I disagree with almost everything Forsberg has written,
beginning with her volitive explanations (democratic restraint, economic calculations)
for the present reluctance of advanced nations to engage in warfare. Nuclear
weapons, of course, badly overshot the culminating point of military usefulness,
being far too effective to be effective, and precluding non-nuclear war as
well, among nuclear-armed powers. But non-nuclear warfare could still be fought
against non-nuclear enemies, and was, up to a point (Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan).
What explains the change is, I fear, a simple loss of vitality in its most
elemental sense: advanced, postindustrial populations with their equal-citizen
females do not produce the exuberant abundance of children (four, six, or
eight per mother) that can at times fuel warlike sentiments, and which does
certainly induce families and societies to accept the casualties of war with
adequate equanimity. (Consider, for example, the USSR, "traumatized" by cumulative
10-year losses in Afghanistan that it would have calmly absorbed before breakfast
when Russian women were still fertile--and this, without democracy or "biased"
TV coverage by the way, whose effect on Vietnam was perhaps 1 percent of what
was imputed by disgruntled blood-and-guts warriors and self-congratulating
network executives alike.) When a Palestinian mother (of 12) whose son has
just been killed says that she is willing to give the lives of more sons to
the cause, she means it; her emotional capital is diversified, not
invested in one son (US) or 0.8 of a son (Germany, Italy).
Forsberg evidently means to rally the dormant peacecamp to arms, so to speak.
She deplores "the tendency of people to work energetically for peace when
war is imminent, and neglect peace at times of peace, when the opportunity
to strengthen peacekeeping institutions is greatest." That equates intentions
with outcomes, failing to reckon with the paradoxical logic of conflict--an
old problem: "Men do not understand [the coincidence of opposites]: there
is a `back-stretched connection' like that of the bow," Herakleitos of Ephesus
wrote--whereby:
1. To "work for peace" in her sense causes war, more so when working "energetically,"
whereas it is the destructions of war (or the expenses and moral fatigue of
war-preparation in cold wars) that brings about peace, by exhausting the resources
and will to persist in war (or war-preparation). To say that Reagan's SDI
ended the Cold War is at least exaggeration, but had Forsberg and those of
like minds succeeded in cutting US defense spending when it was still useful
(not for self-defense, admittedly), the USSR--in its later, military aggrandizement
phase (prompted by the loss of all hope in ideological victory)--would have
lasted longer, and the peoples of Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent
States might still be imprisoned in it. And before then, the arms race that
Forsberg & Co. systematically opposed greatly helped to keep the peace, by
venting acute insecurities into harmless "overkill" weapon programs in lieu
of far more dangerous attempts to conquer strategic depth, the standard prenuclear
remedy.
2. More generally, war-preparation by those actually willing to fight (not
just ritualistic preparations, as is mostly the case in advanced countries
nowadays) may avert war by dissuading others' hopes of easy victories--even
Bosnia might have done it, had it raised a good army before declaring independence--whereas
wishing for peace, marching for peace, etc., is as relevant as wishing and
marching for good weather--except if it interferes with concrete war-preparations,
when it may be counterproductive.
3. "Peacekeeping institutions" commonly perpetuate war, by freezing the processes
that would exhaust it (consider the effect of imposed cease-fires in Arab-Israeli
wars). The various UN peacekeeping forces everywhere are symbolically and
frictionally useful only when other factors (exhaustion, great-power pressure)
are dissuading war. In all other cases they are either ineffectual or, much
more often, counter-productive (as in ex-Yugoslavia).
To pick out one more disagreement among very many, I think it a great mistake
to equate the amount of military spending with the overall harm it can cause
in the absence of a peacekeeping (my sense) benefit. Latin American countries
that spend little are nevertheless very greatly harmed, because the money,
while yielding minuscule combat capabilities, perpetuates military institutions
that in turn systematically limit and undermine fragile democracies, lovingly
cherish and constantly seek to revive any and all territorial rivendications,
and sabotage free movement across borders on a daily basis (by imposing time-consuming
formalities of their own--try driving from Brazil into Bolivia), even opposing
road construction up to border points (as an anti-invasion measure, no less).
As for sub-Saharan Africa, the money spent on armed forces causes all of the
above, plus even more disproportionate economic damage, by way of enterprise-dissuading
extortion, looting, and sheer destruction (for example, Congo Brazzaville,
of late).
In other words, $1 billion spent in the United States or France can be a
socially useful form of outdoor relief--e.g., for defense-industry CEOs who
might otherwise be on welfare (when they try to run firms in competitive
industries they routinely fail, disastrously)--whereas $1 spent in Latin America
or sub-Saharan Africa can easily cause $1,000 or $100,000 worth of damage.
The Clinton administration's decision to offer authority-enhancing advanced
fighters to the likes of Chile is thus exceptionally unconscionable, as was
the recent decision to sell a fancy $350 million prestige-enhancing warship
to the useless Venezuelan navy--the money for which, by the way, was borrowed
on the New York market, augmenting the "investment in Latin America" statistics,
and forcing Venezuelans to pay interest on a non-income earning, cost-generating
non-asset.
It is particularly dispiriting to find that Forsberg still believes at this
late date in offensive-force/defensive-force differentiations at the strategic
(war/peace) level. That the tactical characteristics of weapons, that the
operational characteristic of forces, imply nothing whatever about their strategic
role is surely not a proposition that is in need of further proof. (Iraq could
have invaded Kuwait with anti-aircraft regiments, whereas only tanks could
have defended Kuwait). Actually the "back-stretched connection, like that
of the bow" ensures that the (tactically) most offensive weapons are much
more often peace-inducing or peace-preserving than the (tactically) most defensive
weapons (consider F-16 fighter-bombers in Bosnia versus Bosno-Serb trenches,
or if one likes, Minuteman ICBMs versus an-actually-functioning SDI).