‘Underestimating the role that Iran
plays inside Iraq is a potentially fatal
mistake’ Helena Cobban
8
Barry Posen is right to make the case for a substantial withdrawal
of U.S. forces from Iraq (though I continue to argue for a withdrawal
that, unlike his, is complete, speedy, and generous to Iraqis
and other non-Americans financially and politically). He is right
to diagnose the present situation as, essentially, one of a “stalemated
counterinsurgency.” And, crucially, he is right to argue
that the longer the administration delays making a public commitment
to a substantial drawdown of troops, the greater the political
and financial costs. Having said that, however, the course he
advocates remains deeply unsatisfactory—even unrealistic.
This is for two main reasons: first, Posen misreads key aspects
of the situation inside Iraq, in particular the role that Iran
already plays in its politics; second, he almost completely ignores
broader trends in a global political system of which Iraq—both
the country and the issue—is nowadays a part.
Posen dubs his plan a
“disengagement” strategy. But what he proposes is very far from a
disengagement: he argues for a continuing U.S. military role inside
Iraq that, in the event of an open civil war, would play a
“balancing role” among the antagonists with the goal of achieving
what he describes as a “stalemated civil war.” (His model for
this is the role of the UN and NATO in Bosnia—not a very
encouraging precedent for anyone involved.) Since mid-November, it
has become increasingly clear that the Bush administration has indeed
decided to adopt a “troop drawdown plus (largely) off-shore
balancing” policy similar to that advocated by Posen. But this
policy is already doomed to failure. As in the case of Israel’s
lengthy pursuit post-1985 of a “small force inside plus threat of
massive strikes from outside” policy in Lebanon, if the United
States tries to pursue this kind of policy in Iraq it will continue
to find itself facing powerful opposing forces there; and it will
eventually—after how many more American and Iraqi
deaths?—conclude that a complete or near-complete withdrawal from
the country is the only viable path.
Both non- and
anti-U.S. forces inside Iraq draw strength in part from their
longstanding ties to supportive neighbors. (I’m referring to Iran,
in the case of the 60-plus percent of Iraqis who are Shias, and to
the Sunni Arab world in the case of Iraq’s Arab Sunnis.)
Underestimating the very strong role that Iran already plays inside
Iraq is a potentially fatal mistake. Posen’s misunderstanding of
Iran’s role is evident throughout this piece; for example, when he
writes, “Neighbors—including Syria, Iran, and Turkey—need to be
quietly warned about the . . . price they might pay for . . . actions
against the Iraqi government.” Why would the Iranians take actions
against the pre–December 15 Iraqi government when roughly two
thirds of its members—just like two thirds of the members of the
post-December government there—are already, effectively, in their
pocket?
Washington’s second post-invasion viceroy in
Iraq, Paul Bremer, completely disbanded the country’s armed forces
and national police. That action, coming on top of the U.S.
military’s earlier failure to prevent the looting of ministries and
much other vital national infrastructure, completed the effective
dismantling of the Iraqi state; and despite the billions of dollars
poured into rebuilding projects since then, the occupation forces
have completely failed at the politics of postwar national
reconstruction. This failure had many consequences, including
crucially the failure of the United States to reconstitute any
national-level Iraqi security forces that have the motivation, unit
cohesion, and leadership required to hold the country together.
Instead, we now have well-developed but segregated militias in the
Kurdish and Shia areas that have been armed, supplied, and bankrolled
by the United States for many months.
The political failure of
national reconstruction created a big opportunity for subnational
efforts at reconstruction. Two forces seized this opportunity: in the
north, the coalition of two Kurdish parties; in the south, a
coalition of Iranian-backed Shiite militias. Along the way, the
broader coalition of Shias-plus-Kurds captured all the positions of
national-level “leadership” contested in last January’s
election; and they will certainly dominate the national elections of
December 2005. Not that these national-level positions have ever been
connected to any structures capable of effective nationwide
governance and service provision. Instead, they have been used almost
purely like government positions in any failed-state kleptocracy: as
opportunities for massive graft, patronage, and political
intimidation.
The amount of power that Iraq already wields
within Iraq has three large implications for Posen’s analysis.
First, it makes no sense to try to justify the presence of U.S.
forces in the region by the argument that they are needed to deter
moves against the Iraqi political order. Second, inside Iraq, the
United States can no longer even aspire to be the hegemonic power: it
does not have the capacity to redraw the country’s internal
balance, as Posen suggests. Third, control of the oilfields at the
head of the Gulf is already much closer to being
“concentrated”—and in pro-Tehran hands, too—than Posen
stipulates as being in the U.S. “national interest.” So at the
level of Gulf-wide geopolitics, as in Iraq, the United States is much
weaker than Posen suggests. All this against a global strategic
background in which the thus-far peaceful, rules-based rise of the
two emerging Asian powers, China and India, is already starting to
challenge U.S. hegemony elsewhere.
The “stakes” in Iraq
for U.S. national security (as defined by Posen and most other
American strategic commentators) are therefore much larger than he
implies. This is just one reason why the “Bosnia-like” strategy
that he proposes seems willfully wrongheaded. Ten years of stalemate
might be bearable for the United States regarding 1990s Bosnia but
not regarding a key Persian Gulf nation today.
For my part, I do not define the
U.S. national interest in terms of a hegemonic (or even simply
“balancing”) U.S. military presence in the gulf region.
The best interests of Americans will be served if we and our leaders
build a relationship of equality, nonviolence, and cooperation
with the 96 percent of the world’s people who are not Americans.
We need an end to Bush-style unilateralism—which I read
Posen as seeking to perpetuate, both in Iraq and in the Gulf.
It needs to be replaced with a renewed commitment to multilateral,
UN-based action to confront the challenges posed by the political
and geopolitical shifts that are already underway in Iraq and
the rest of the Gulf region. The Bush administration has done
a huge amount to shred the capabilities of the international body
(which also has its own pressing internal problems). But the kind
of rules-based international mediation that the UN alone can provide
may well be the only factor capable of helping extricate the United
States from George Bush’s disastrous imbroglio in Iraq.
Posen’s misnamed “disengagement” offers no such
promise. <
Helena Cobban
is a global-affairs columnist for The Christian Science Monitor and Al-Hayat, and a contributing editor of Boston Review.
Click here to return to the
New
Democracy Forum “Exit Strategy.”
Originally published in the January/February
2006 issue of Boston Review
|